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Background: Health care worker (HCW) colonization with methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a
documented cause of hospital outbreaks and contributes to ongoing transmission. At Royal Perth Hospital (RPH) it
had been anecdotally noted that the increasing prevalence of EMRSA-15 appeared to be associated with increased
HCW colonization compared with Aus2/3-EMRSA. Hence we compared HCW colonization rates during outbreaks of
EMRSA-15 and Aus2/3-EMRSA at a single institution.
Methods: We performed a retrospective review of EMRSA-15 and Aus2/3-EMRSA outbreaks from 2000–2009 at RPH,
a quaternary hospital in Western Australia. Outbreak files were reviewed and relevant data extracted.
Results: Ten EMRSA-15 outbreaks were compared with seven Aus2/3 outbreaks. The number of patients colonized
was similar between EMRSA-15 and Aus2/3-EMRSA outbreaks (median 7 [range 3–20] and 11 [5–26], respectively;
P = 0.07) but the number of HCWs colonized was significantly higher in EMRSA-15 outbreaks compared to Aus2/3-EMRSA
outbreaks (median 4 [range 0–15] and 2 [1-3], respectively; P = 0.013). The percentage of HCWs colonized was also higher
in EMRSA-15 outbreaks versus Aus2/3-EMRSA outbreaks (median 3.4% [range 0–5.5%] and 0.81% [0.56–2.2%], respectively;
P = 0.013).
Conclusions: This study demonstrates a higher level of HCW colonization during EMRSA-15 outbreaks compared with
Aus2/3-EMRSA outbreaks. This finding suggests that MRSA vary in their ability to colonize HCWs and contribute to
outbreaks. MRSA type should be determined during outbreaks and future research should investigate the mechanisms by
which EMRSA-15 contributes to increased HCW colonization.
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Methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is an
important cause of hospital-acquired infection and has a
high mortality rate. At Royal Perth Hospital (RPH) a 10-
year retrospective study demonstrated a 30-day mortality
rate of 27.5% for hospital associated MRSA bacteraemia
[1], similar to an Australasian study, in which 30-day mor-
tality was 30% [2].
Healthcare-associated MRSA (HA-MRSA) can cause
hospital outbreaks and rapidly replace other S. aureus* Correspondence: julie.hart@health.wa.gov.au
1Department of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, PathWest Laboratory
Medicine, Royal Perth Hospital, Perth, Western Australia, Australia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2014 Hart et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd
Commons Attribution License (http://creativec
reproduction in any medium, provided the or
Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.or
unless otherwise stated.strains [3]. The most prevalent HA-MRSA clones in
Australia are ST22-MRSA-IV (also known as epidemic
MRSA (EMRSA)-15), and ST239-MRSA-III (Aus2/3-
EMRSA or EMRSA-1), which accounted for 45.9% and
49.3% of all HA-MRSA isolated in the 2011 Australian
Group on Antimicrobial Resistance national antimicrobial
surveillance on hospital-onset S. aureus infections [4].
Healthcare worker (HCW) involvement in MRSA
transmission has been summarised in a review of 127
outbreak studies [5]. In this review, 4.6% of 33,318
HCWs were MRSA colonized, with a higher prevalence
in the Australian/New Zealand studies (9.7%). A point
prevalence study performed at RPH showed a preva-
lence of MRSA colonisation of only 3.4% among 1,542. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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working on high risk wards (defined as isolation wards
where known MRSA colonised patients were admitted and
geriatric wards) – 10.7% versus 2.5% on low risk (all other)
wards (P < 0.01) [6]. MRSA transmission from HCWs to
patients has been well documented. In a 10-year retrospect-
ive Dutch study, 13/17 MRSA outbreaks involved HCWs,
with at least four of the outbreaks implicating HCWs as the
index case [7]. A review showed that 63/68 (93%) studies
that undertook patient and HCW MRSA genotyping dem-
onstrated isolates were likely clonally related [5].
In Western Australia (WA) a “search and destroy” MRSA
management policy has successfully controlled nosocomial
spread of HA-MRSA [8]. HCW MRSA colonization con-
tributes to the cause and maintenance of hospital MRSA
outbreaks, hence better understanding of the factors that
contribute to HCW MRSA colonization will lead to
improved control of MRSA outbreaks. At RPH it had
been noted anecdotally that the increasing prevalence
of EMRSA-15 appeared to be associated with increased
HCW colonization compared to that seen with other
MRSA strains. We therefore performed a retrospective
study of EMRSA-15 and Aus2/3-EMRSA outbreaks
from 2000–2009 to determine the colonisation rate in
HCWs according to the MRSA strain.
Methods
Setting
A retrospective review was performed on MRSA out-
breaks recorded by the infection control team at RPH
from 1st January 2000 to 31st December 2009. RPH is a
quaternary 724-bed hospital, with approximately 7000
staff members. EMRSA are not endemic at RPH. As a
retrospective non-interventional study Ethics Committee
review was waived.
Population screened
WA MRSA management policy mandates screening on
admission to hospital of long-term care facility residents
and patients who have been hospitalized or employed in
a hospital outside WA, in the preceding year. Screening
is also performed at RPH on patients admitted for elect-
ive cardiothoracic or orthopaedic surgery or to intensive
care or bone marrow transplant units. Additionally, pa-
tients epidemiologically linked to single strain outbreaks
(defined under “Outbreak Definition”) are also screened.
HCWs who have been hospitalised or employed in a
hospital outside of WA in the preceding 12 months also
have mandatory screening. HCWs working on wards
with single strain outbreaks are also screened (detailed
under “Outbreak Definition”). The policy also includes
MRSA decolonization, which has been shown to assist
in preventing and controlling nosocomial transmission
of MRSA [5].Microbiology methods
During the study period patient screening included
swabbing anterior nares and any broken skin. Prior to
2003, throat and perineum swabs were also collected.
Screening of HCWs included swabbing anterior nares,
throat and all broken skin areas. From 2008 onwards the
nose and throat specimens were tested using the BD
GeneOhm™ MRSA Assay (instead of culture only which
was performed prior to 2008) and positives were con-
firmed by culture. Throughout the study period culture
only was performed on swabs collected from other sites;
briefly, swabs were inoculated onto MRSA selective solid
media and into MRSA enrichment broth which was sub-
cultured after 20 hours incubation. Antimicrobial suscepti-
bility testing was performed by either disc diffusion on
Mueller-Hinton agar (CLSI criteria), the Vitek2 ® AST-P579
card (bioMérieux) or E-test ® (bioMérieux). HA-EMRSA
strains were characterised by the Australian Collaborating
Centre for Enterococcus and Staphylococcus Species (AC-
CESS) Typing and Research as previously described [1].
Outbreak definition
An outbreak was defined when three or more patients
with the same MRSA strain were temporally linked to the
same ward. From 1993 to 2004, the isolation of MRSA
from a patient prompted all room contacts to be screened.
If a second patient was identified screening was extended
to all patients on the ward. If a third patient was identified
with the same MRSA strain, a second ward screen was
performed, including all HCWs (medical, nursing, allied
health and patient care assistants [PCAs]) associated with
the ward. From 2004 onwards HCW screening was per-
formed using the same protocol if the outbreak was
EMRSA-15. For non-EMRSA-15 investigations, HCW
screening was only performed if more than three patients
were identified with the same strain. For the whole study
period, follow-up screening ceased after two negative ward
screens, usually performed three to four weeks apart.
Commencement and resolution of an outbreak were de-
fined as the date when the first and last MRSA colonized
patient or HCW were identified.
Outbreak control
Patients were isolated in single rooms with contact pre-
cautions. Decolonization occurred if patients did not have
any wounds or invasive devices and involved nasal mupir-
ocin 2%, three times per day, for 10 days), whole-body
antisepsis (3% hexachlorophene emulsion once daily, for
10 days and 20% cetrimide shampoo three times per
week). Decolonization of HCWs was the same and HCWs
on decolonization treatment were able to return to work
immediately. Decolonization was commenced without re-
peating the initial screening swabs, hence transient or per-
sistent colonization could not be distinguished. Systemic
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MRSA throat carriage or remained persistently colo-
nized post decolonization treatment. During an out-
break two-step cleaning and disinfection (phenolic 1:64)
of the environment was employed.
Measures and statistical analysis
For each EMRSA-15 or Aus2/3-EMRSA outbreak the fol-
lowing information was collected: patient demographic
data, outbreak location and duration and the number of pa-
tients and HCWs screened. Statistical analysis was per-
formed using IBM SPSS version 19. Means were compared
using the Student’s t-test or the Wilcoxon non-parametric
test, where appropriate. Percentages were compared with
the Pearson’s χ2 or Fischer’s exact test. P values of < 0.05
were considered significant.
Results
We detected ten EMRSA-15 and seven Aus2/3-EMRSA
outbreaks and median outbreak durations were comparable
(50 and 52 days, respectively). The number of patients and
HCWs screened was similar between EMRSA-15 and
Aus2/3-EMRSA outbreaks (Table 1). The number and
percentage of patients colonized with EMRSA-15 and
Aus2/3-EMRSA were equivalent (Figure 1, Table 1). Both
the number and percentage of HCWs colonized with
EMRSA-15 were significantly higher compared to HCWs
colonized with Aus2/3-EMRSA; median 4 [range 0–15]
and 2 [1-3]; P = 0.013 (Table 1) and median 3.4% (range 0–
5.5%) and 0.81% (0.56–2.2%); P = 0.013 (Table 1, Figures 2
and 3). In one Aus2/3-EMRSA outbreak the number of
HCWs screened was not recorded. The percentage of
HCWs who could not be contacted or who declined
screening was similar during both EMRSA-15 and Aus2/3-
EMRSA outbreaks (19% and 13%). Over the study period
the proportion of colonized patients per outbreak declined,
but the proportion of HCWs colonized remained stable
(Figure 3). Nursing staff comprised the majority of colo-
nized HCWs (40 of 64 [63%] whose role was known),
followed by PCAs (17 of 64 [27%]). No colonized agency
nursing staff were detected, but they were screened muchTable 1 Comparison of EMRSA-15 and Aus2/3-EMRSA outbrea
EMRSA-15
Number of outbreaks 10
Median duration of outbreaks (range) 50 days (2
Median number of patients screened (range) 106 (39–33
Median number of HCWs screened (range) 125 (72–33
Median number of patients colonized (range) 7 (3–20)
Median percent of patients colonized (range) 6.69 (1.12-
Median number of HCWs colonized (range) 4 (0–15)
Median percent of HCW colonized (range) 3.36 (0–5.5less frequently than permanent nursing staff (160 of 312
[51%] agency staff were not screened compared with 37 of
304 [12%] permanent nursing staff).
Discussion
To our knowledge this is the first study to show a signifi-
cantly higher prevalence of HCW colonization during
EMRSA-15 outbreaks compared to Aus2/3-EMRSA out-
breaks. Few prior studies provide details of the EMRSA
strain type and a comparison of the prevalence of both pa-
tient and HCW colonization. Our study suggests MRSA
strains vary in their ability to colonize HCWs and contrib-
ute to outbreaks. EMRSA-15 has become the predominant
HA-MRSA in Australia and many other countries [9], so
our results have implications for daily practice. We there-
fore believe MRSA typing should be determined during
outbreaks to influence decisions on HCW screening and
decolonisation and should be reported in infection control
publications, to better determine the influence of MRSA
type on outbreak characteristics and control.
A German study comparing MRSA carriage between
staff and residents at a nursing home found more carriage
of a PVL-positive strain (7.6% of 197 residents and 5.8% of
104 staff ) compared with a multidrug resistant MRSA
strain (3.0% of 197 residents and 1% of 104 staff) [10]. Al-
though this study was not specifically designed to compare
patient and HCW MRSA carriage rates based on ST type,
it also suggests that HCW carriage rates vary between
EMRSA ST types. We could not find any other studies
specifically designed to address the question of variable
HCW MRSA carriage rates by sequence type.
The prevalence of HCW colonization (3.4% EMRSA-15
and 0.81% Aus2/3-EMRSA) in our study was lower than
other published Australia and New Zealand studies [5].
This is probably attributable to our longstanding state-
wide, “search and destroy” MRSA management policy that
includes screening of high risk patients, aggressive out-
break management policies and strict isolation and con-
tact precautions for patients with epidemic HA-MRSA
colonization. The decrease in proportion of patients colo-
nized over the study period suggests measures introducedks
Aus2/3 P value
7 NA
2–128) 52 days (20–392) 0.69
8) 124 (103–137) 0.59
0) 159 (120–288) 0.30
11 (5–26) 0.07
15.09) 8.87 (4.76-20.63) 0.27
2 (1–3) 0.013





















































Figure 1 Percentage patients and HCWs colonized by outbreak strain and year (multiple outbreaks occurred in some years).
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at RPH. However the proportion of HCWs colonized
remained stable over the same period, suggesting con-
trol measures other than those designed to limit trans-
mission via HCWs are responsible for the reduced
proportion of colonized patients. This implies hand hy-
giene and methods to prevent transmission to HCWs
should remain an ongoing focus of outbreak manage-
ment. At RPH hand hygiene compliance rates were poor
when a formal hand hygiene auditing program was first
introduced in February 2008 – 40% across all HCW
groups (personal communication, Rosie Lee).
The majority of colonized HCWs in this study were
nursing staff, followed by PCAs. These two groups should

























Figure 2 Comparison of median patient and HCW colonization
rates for all EMRSA-15 and Aus2/3-EMRSA outbreaks.plans. A MRSA HCW prevalence study performed at RPH
also showed highest levels of colonization in HCWs most
in contact with patients – 6.8% of patient care assistants
and 5.2% of nursing staff, compared with 0.7% of doctors
[5]. No agency nursing staff in our study were colonized
despite representing a large proportion of nursing staff,
possibly as a result of the low numbers who were avail-
able or agreed to be screened (results not presented).
This finding may have introduced bias and suggests that
strategies need to be developed to enable a larger pro-
portion of agency staff to be screened to determine if
they are an unidentified reservoir of MRSA transmis-
sion, particularly as they more commonly work at mul-
tiple hospitals and residential care facilities. All HCWs





















































Figure 3 Proportion of patients and HCWs colonized during
outbreaks of EMRSA-15 and Aus2/3-EMRSA 2000–2009.
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transferring from EMRSA-15 endemic hospitals is unlikely
to explain the increased HCW EMRSA-15 colonization
rates.
Potential limitations of this study are the retrospective
design and the small numbers of outbreaks and low
colonization rates, but despite this our findings were sta-
tistically significant. Microbiology methods changed over
the study period, which may have increased MRSA de-
tection rates in the latter years of the study when
EMRSA-15 predominated. Aus2/3-EMRSA has been
noted anecdotally at RPH to preferentially colonize the
perineum. The perineum was not screened in HCWs, so
if this association is true then Aus2/3-EMRSA colonisa-
tion of HCWs may have been underestimated. A signifi-
cant number of HCWs were not contactable or declined
MRSA screening during each outbreak, which may have
introduced bias, although the percentage of HCWs not
screened was similar during EMRSA-15 and Aus2/3-
EMRSA outbreaks. S. aureus carriage can be transient
and HCWs in our institution are given decolonization
therapy prior to any repeat screening, so this could have
created biases within our dataset. Transient MRSA
colonization rates in HCWs (32%) are known from a
prior prevalence study at RPH [6]. Changes to outbreak
investigation policy in 2004 meant non-EMRSA-15 out-
breaks were investigated only when a fourth patient was
found colonized which may have caused a delay in HCW
screening and less instigation of HCW screening during
Aus2/3-EMRSA outbreaks. However, only one Aus2/3-
EMRSA outbreak involved HCW screening after this
guideline change, consequently this is unlikely to have af-
fected the results. Increased awareness of MRSA amongst
HCWs and improved infection control team EMRSA out-
break management over the decade should have reduced
HCW colonization in the later stages of the study when
EMRSA-15 became the predominant outbreak strain,
nonetheless our HCW colonization rates remained higher
during EMRSA-15 outbreaks.
The reasons for increased EMRSA-15 colonization of
HCWs are largely unknown. Biologically plausible explana-
tions include that EMRSA-15 carries fewer resistant traits,
a smaller SCCmec element and “core” genome, together
with the acquisition of additional accessory genomic ele-
ments may have conferred to this particular clone higher
epidemicity and growth rate, greater biofilm formation, en-
hanced capacity for dissemination and invasion and ability
to persist that might explain its greater success and fitness
[11]. Therefore, potential factors promoting colonization of
HCWs by EMRSA-15 includes its preferential colonization
of sites on patients likely to contaminate HCWs (e.g. skin
or wounds, in preference to perineum), increased trans-
mission into the environment, ability to adhere to skin
and environmental surfaces and replication ability. Themechanisms by which EMRSA-15 leads to higher HCW
colonization rates should be of foremost importance in fu-
ture research studies.
Conclusions
This is the first study to demonstrate two different HA-
MRSA strains (EMRSA-15 and Aus2/3-EMRSA) have dif-
ferential HCW colonization rates during outbreaks within
the same institution. This suggests EMRSA strains vary in
their ability to colonize HCWs. This study highlights the
importance of characterizing EMRSA strains to determine
the likely source of the outbreak and to assist with
EMRSA outbreak control. EMRSA type should be deter-
mined during outbreaks and future research should inves-
tigate the mechanisms by which EMRSA-15 is associated
with increased HCW colonization.
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